241 1949, is hardly feasible. Analysis of similar claims advanced in other captive countries reveals similar discrepancies and exaggerations.

There are two areas of agricultural production which require special comment. In one the Communists have achieved a very modest success; in the other their failure has been conspicuous. In both instances the results shed light on the general character of Communist agrarian policy, for the success was in industrial crops, the failure in livestock.

● 131 Livestock production—both dairy products and meat—is rightly regarded as one of the basic indices of agricultural prosperity and health. This is so because the cost, in terms of grain produce siphoned off for fodder, is usually high, and only an economy which has a sufficiently high productivity level can afford it. In other words, the caloric value of a given quantity of meat is far lower than that of the grain used in producing it. Only those countries producing a sufficient grain surplus can therefore consider expanding the livestock population. In pre-war Eastern Europe, the general practice was to export surplus grain. On the other hand, a more richly endowed land such as Denmark converted its surplus grain into dairy products before exporting it, and thereby further enriched itself. In Communist Eastern Europe, where grain produc-

TABLE 25

NUMBER OF CATTLE IN EASTERN EUROPE*

Country	1938	1952	Percent of Pre-War
	(millions of head)		
Czechoslovakia	4.4	4.3	98
Poland	9.9	7.4	75
Hungary	2.3	1.8	78
Romania	3.5	3.5	100
Bulgaria	1.5	—**	—**
Yugoslavia	4.3	4.8	112

* All countries except Romania: *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, (Geneva, 1953). Romania: Gh. Gh-Dej, in *For a Lasting Peace*, August 28, 1953.

** No figures for Bulgaria are available. However, Chervenkov, speaking December 16, 1953, admitted that livestock were still below pre-war levels.

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tion had hardly reached pre-war levels by 1951, and the demands of the urban population were rapidly increasing, the possibilities of increased livestock production were small. Indeed, the fodder supply was below the level necessary for maintaining *existing* livestock population. Therefore (see Table 25), the number of cattle in Eastern Europe had not, by 1952, quite achieved the pre-war levels.

But livestock failure is not recorded merely in terms of quantity, but in quality as well. Czechoslovak Premier Siroky furnished an interesting comment on this point:

> In the sphere of animal husbandry we must proceed from the fact that of late the head of cattle has increased without a corresponding extension of the fodder base. Consequently, the head of cattle has grown to the detriment of the quality of the stock and its productivity. Without a serious extension of the fodder base it will be impossible to ensure improvement of the productivity of the stock which, from the point of view of supplying the people with high-grade meat and other high-grade products of animal husbandry, is a most urgent matter.[25]

One of the chief causes of livestock deterioration is the reliance of East European regimes upon the increasingly impoverished non-collectivized sector for most livestock produce. As Table 26 makes clear, in each country the livestock in the socialist sector is proportionately less than the amount of land "socialized." Moreover, the major portion of the stock in the collectivized sector is not collective property, but belongs to the peasant households. In Poland, for example, 71 per cent of the cattle, 75.5 per cent of the sheep, and 75.8 per cent of the hogs in the collectivized land belongs to private household plots.[26]

Thus while the "Socialist sector" concentrates upon marketing grain and industrial crops, the private sector and the collectivized households emphasize livestock products. However, as the private sector has been deprived of credits and resources with which to purchase fodder and other necessities, the quality of the livestock has inevitably deteriorated. In spite of the introduction of new "zootechnical methods" on certain model farms, most livestock con-

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[25] *For a Lasting Peace*, September 18, 1953. Remarks of a very similar character cropped up in the August 22nd address of the Rumanian Premier, Gheorghiu-Dej, and in the September 8th address of the Bulgarian Premier Chervenkov.

[26] *Ekonomista* (Warsaw), III, 1953, p. 48.

231 times to be bred and raised by the traditionally backward East European methods.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVESTOCK IN SOCIALIST SECTOR IN 1952*

Country	Percent of land in Socialist sector	Cattle	Sheep	Hogs	Horses
Czechoslovakia	48.0	33.0	39.7	38.0	—
Poland	17.0	7.8	—	9.2	7.1
Bulgaria	53.0	25.2	29.9	17.6	43.5

* Sources: Czechoslovakia, Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo*, February 5, 1953; Poland, *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 25 (Warsaw, 1951); Bulgaria, Chervenkov, *For a Lasting Peace*, September 11, 1953.

141 While animal husbandry lagged, industrial crops crept ahead. Even in this realm, despite increased investments, results have not been spectacular. Few reliable production statistics are available. Table 27 shows only the increase in area given over to industrial crops.[37]

2. *The Return on the Investment*

423 In its basic features the picture thus far drawn of East European agriculture resembles the one drawn earlier of Soviet agriculture: a strenuous effort to force the peasantry into a farm system over which the State could exercise direct administrative control; a feverish effort to build modernized industry at a pace which precluded much investment in agriculture; a resultant stagnation of and, in some instances, a deterioration of, agricultural production; and a constant tension between State and the peasants arising from their unending struggle over the fruits of the peasants' labors.

In the USSR, however, the victory of the State over the peasantry was concluded with far greater finality than in Satellite Eastern Europe; the system held together over a quarter of a century which included the most severe war-time trials. Collectivization in the USSR possesses stability because it has managed to provide the State with the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for its economic

[37] It is significant that among the many steps taken to implement the New Course in several East European countries was the reduction of the area sown with industrial crops.

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But if the State Farms exceed independent farms in grain marketing, the so-called kulaks exceed even the State Farms. With only 11.1 per cent of the arable land, they account for 19 per cent of the marketed grain. Precisely for this reason the Polish economist, Jerzy Tepicht, in an article published in December 1953, warned against the "irresponsible policy of destroying the productive capacity" of the kulaks.[46] If the kulaks cannot be broken, the regime must cooperate with them or risk an agricultural crisis such as occurred in Hungary in 1953.

The same Tepicht, in an article on the general problem of marketing, tried to establish the thesis that State Farms had come to play the same role in marketing that had formerly been held by large landowners.[47] In pre-war times the large landowners, holding 18.1 per cent of the land, contributed 29.9 per cent of the total marketed grain. Today, the State Farms, holding 12 per cent of the arable land, deliver 21.2 per cent of the marketed grain. Tepicht concludes that the marketing ability of the State Farms equals that of the pre-war landed estates, and thereby justifies the existence of the State Farms. The only flaw in his argument – aside from the peculiarity of such a justification on the part of a Communist! – lies in the fact that the majority of the State Farms (73.7 per cent) are in the Western territories where private farms also deliver high grain surpluses to the market. Holding only 31.1 per cent of the arable land, private farmers in the Western territories market 65.4 per cent of the grain delivered by the private sector in all Poland.[48] It seems likely, therefore, that the superior marketing power of the State Farms is due as much to their geographical location as to their internal structure.

In addition, it should be noted that the State Farms have established their grain marketing record at the cost of a very poorly developed livestock, a condition which they have in common with the collectives. Whereas the small farmers, with 11.5 per cent of the arable land, possess 20 per cent of the pigs and cows, and all the independent farms, with 76.5 per cent of the arable land, raise 93.1 per cent of the cattle and 90.1 per cent of the pigs, the State Farms, with 12 per cent of the land, raise only 9.2 per cent of the

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[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) December 31, 1953.
[47] *Ekonomista*, III, 1953, pp. 31-2.
[48] *Ibid*, p. 35. Tepicht's figures differ from those given above (Table 29) but the difference is slight, and either set would support his argument.

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pigs and six per cent of the cows. The kolkozes, with over six per cent of the land, raise less than one per cent of the cattle, pigs, and sheep. [49] The neglect of livestock is evidently characteristic of large-scale farming in Poland since the kulaks, who also produce a high marketable surplus, have also had negligible success in animal husbandry.

Despite these modifications, the State Farms have played a sizeable role in establishing the Communist-desired relationship between the town and country. It is also clear that, up to this point, the collectivized sector has played a very limited role.

Czechoslovakia

The data relating to sector-by-sector marketing in Czechoslovakia is, unfortunately, even more scattered than in Poland, and permits less conclusive inferences. For example, it is known that in 1950 the State purchased 46 per cent of the grain production of both sectors, collective and private. It is also known that in 1949 the farms of less than 10 hectares—virtually all the private sector—contributed only 33 per cent of their production to the State.[50] Therefore, it can be assumed that the "Socialist sector"—mostly State Farms in 1949, but including a large number of collectives in 1950—contributed a higher portion of its produce than did the private farms. Furthermore, in 1951 farms of under 10 hectares accounted for only 39 per cent of grain deliveries, so that presumably the larger farms contributed more than their proportionate share of the market.[51]

In 1953, according to official Czechoslovak statistics, the "Socialist sector," comprising over 50 per cent of the land, accounted for 51 per cent of the marketed grain, 46 per cent of the marketed cattle, 57 per cent of the marketed pigs, and 43 per cent of the marketed milk.[52] These figures suggest that the market benefits gained by the Czechoslovak State are quite modest, and frequent claims that the collectives fulfill quotas more fully than the private

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[49] *Trybuna Ludu*, December 31, 1953; Jan Wyrozebski, Radio Warsaw, January 22, 1954.

[50] *Rude Pravo*, (Prague) February 22, 1951.

[51] *Nova Mysl* (Prague), November, 1953. The farms under 10 hectares, comprising 51 per cent of the arable land, contributed only 39 per cent of the marketed grain while the collective farms in 1951, holding 19 per cent of the land, contributed 20.7 per cent of the marketed grain.

[52] *Zpravy Statniho Uradu Statistickeho* (Prague), January 31, 1954.

433 farms are not altogether true.[53] At the same time, the greater con-
231 fidence the regime has in the capacity of the collectives to fulfill
475 quotas is not altogether unjustified.

[231] Although the bulk of livestock in Poland is in the private sector, a sizeable portion of the livestock in Czechoslovakia is in the "Socialist sector." In 1952, 33.8 per cent of the cattle, 37.7 per cent of the hogs, and 38.7 per cent of the sheep were in the "Socialist sector."[54]

Although the Czechoslovak regime may have gained some market advantages from collectivization, its victory remains quite inconclusive. With the New Course, the regime, in turning to the private sector for agricultural reinforcement, acknowledged that the advantage gained was insufficient for its purposes.[55]

Hungary

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433 The transformation of the agricultural structure in Hungary in 1945-46 was the most drastic of the post-war land reforms; and there is unquestionably a connection between the semi-revolutionary character of that agrarian reform and the special gravity of the Hungarian farm crisis in mid-1953. Whether this crisis had its roots in peasant hyper-sensitivity to the imposition of an overlordship resembling former conditions, or to the destruction of traditional trade relationships between town and country is not altogether clear; but that a close connection exists between the 1945-46 reform and the 1953 crisis is difficult to doubt.[56]

The impact of the 1945-46 reforms on the traditional trade

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[53] For example, *Rude Pravo* (December 4, 1953), asserted that the collective farms had fulfilled their quotas for grain by 103 per cent while the private farms had fulfilled their quota by only 77 per cent. A similar differential held for the fulfillment of meat, pork, and milk quotas.

[54] Cited in *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 19, 1953, p. 484.

[55] As in Poland, the Czechoslovak New Course placed special emphasis upon protecting the productive capacity of the kulaks while at the same time, of course, limiting his alleged urge to engage in speculation and exploitation. "It would harm our agricultural economy," said Minister of Agriculture Uher, if the land which the kulaks occupied was not "fully utilized by them" (*Rude Pravo*, November 10, 1953).

[56] A subjective factor such as the peasants' degree of class consciousness is difficult to incorporate into an analysis of this type. However, without some recourse to this factor, it is difficult to explain the special depth of the 1953 Hungarian crisis, so much more pronounced was it than similar crises in the sphere. The series of articles in the Hungarian press during the fall and summer of 1953 portraying the countryside during the period of kolkhoz dissolutions certainly suggested that the Hungarian peasantry felt a hatred for their oppressors of an intensity hardly rivaled in the Sphere. It should not be forgotten that the strongest of the post-World War II peasant parties in the sphere was the Smallholders' Party of Hungary, which received 57 per cent of the vote in 1947 elections.

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241 511 433 area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia	31	54
England and Wales	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands ..	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland ..	89	156	Poland.. ..	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania ..	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia ..	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania ..	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

[134] The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

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LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia ..	59.1	63.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	45.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning-*Economic Development in S.E. Europe*, 1945, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

407 241 On the question of agricultural implements and machinery, the PEP study states :

'The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000